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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a stylised framework to examine how skill-biased technological
change and labour market frictions affect the relationship between economic
expansion and unskilled unemployment. The first part of the analysis focuses on the
investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities faced by
workers and firms in response to the introduction of an innovative technology. The
second part examines how endogenous two-sided heterogeneity in the labour market
affects the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of unemployment, technological
diffusion, and economic expansion. To conclude, the framework is used to discuss the
effects of alternative forms of policy intervention on agents' investment decisions and on
the macroeconomic outcomes.
JEL Classification: C78, J24, J64, O33.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider an economy experiencing a wave of skill-biased technological
change in presence of labour market frictions. The rst part of our analysis considers
the investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities faced
by workers and rms in response to the introduction of an innovative technology. The
second part examines how endogenous two-sided heterogeneity in the labour market
a¤ects the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of unemployment, technological di¤u-
sion, and economic expansion. In our model the policy-maker aims to promote the
di¤usion of an innovative skill-biased technology avoiding an increase in unskilled un-
employment. We show that, when skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities
are both endogenous, this result can be achieved by introducing either subsidies to
education or to innovation. Nevertheless, the choice of the most appropriate form of
intervention depends on the fundamental parameters of the economy.
Our framework aims to provide an analysis of the interaction between skill-biased
technological change and labour market frictions in the determination of unskilled
unemployment and economic expansion. According to the Solow-Phelps paradigm,
technological change and unemployment have been traditionally considered as two
separate economic phenomena. Nevertheless, recent contributions have challenged
this view.1 Pissarides (1990) suggests that, when the labour market is a¤ected by
search and matching frictions, rms planning to invest in new technology hire work-
ers today to save on hiring costs in the future the capitalisation e¤ectgenerating
negative correlation between technological change and unemployment. Aghion and
Howitt (1994) reply that, when technological change is skill-biased, the introduction
of new technologies causes a process of reallocation of workers from old plants to
technologies of more recent vintage. This creative destruction e¤ect may induce pos-
itive correlation between technological change and unemployment. Acemoglu (1997)
remarks that the Neo-Schumpeterian approach to skill-biased technological change
has enriched our understanding about the relationship between economic growth and
unemployment, but it neglects the role played by human capital and skill-formation.
In his model, Acemoglu (1997) shows that when innovating rms promote training
activities for workers, they generate further incentives for other rms to innovate by
increasing the number of skilled workers in the labour force. Thus, subsidies to in-
novation incentivise both technology adoption and skill-acquisition activities at the
same time. This process creates multiplier e¤ects leading to an equilibrium with
complete di¤usion of the innovative technology and low unemployment.
We embrace Acemoglus critique, and we share the view that further attention
should be devoted to the role of human capital formation in the process of di¤usion
of new technologies. However, we argue that Acemoglus approach is still exclusively
focused on rmsside of the labour market because, in his model, technology adoption
1See Aricò (2003) for a survey of recent contributions on the relationship between economic
growth and unemployment.
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and training decisions are both led by rms.2 In contrast, we develop a framework
were both sides of the labour market face a specic investment decision: rms decide
whether to invest in the innovative technology, and workers decide whether to acquire
the skills to operate such technology. We show that, in presence of skill and tech-
nology complementarities, and labour market frictions, the analysis of the strategic
interaction between workers and rms provides new insights to the understanding
of the relationship between economic expansion and unemployment. In our frame-
work, forward-looking workers form expectations on the number of rms adopting
the new technology and on the number of other workers investing in education. On
the opposite side of the labour market, rms develop a similar strategic behaviour.
Workers know that, if more rms invest in the new technology, they will have a higher
probability to be matched with a vacancy demanding a high level of skills, and have
further incentive to invest in education. At the same time, we assume that the educa-
tion technology displays congestion externalities, and that when more workers access
education, the cost of upgrading skills becomes higher. In a similar fashion, rms
incentives to innovate depend positively on the expected number of skilled workers
in the labour market, as well as negatively on the number of other innovators due
to the presence of bottle-neck e¤ects in the process of technology adoption. Thus,
in our framework, strategic complementarities do not arise within the rmsside of
the labour market but across the two sides of the labour market. Additionally, con-
gestion externalities in the process skill-acquisition and technology adoption generate
strategic substitutabilities within each side of the labour market.
There is an increasing consensus on the fact that the most recent waves of tech-
nological change have been of a skill-biased nature.3 To match this stylised fact,
recent research has focused on models displaying heterogeneity in the distribution of
skills across workers and heterogeneity in the distribution of technologies across rms.
Nevertheless, many of these contributions endogenise either the distribution of skills
or the distribution of technologies, taking the heterogeneity a¤ecting the opposite
side of the labour market as exogenously given. For instance, Acemoglu (1999) and
Violante (2002) focus on endogenous technology adoption in presence of exogenous
skill heterogeneity. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Caselli (1999), instead, develop
models of endogenous skill-formation with exogenous technological change. Very few
contributions such as Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Young (1993), Redding (1996),
Gautier (2002), Lloyd-Ellis and Roberts (2002), and Navarro (2009) are able to
characterise a fully endogenous bilateral interaction between the processes of skill-
acquisition and technology adoption. However, these contributions are not part of the
2As a matter of fact, the skills provided by rms through training are often of a specic nature,
and they are unlikely to be completely transferable across di¤erent jobs. To this extent, we regard
skills gained through education as a form of human capital that is easier to be transferred over the
process of job turnover.
3Recent empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis has been provided by Autor et. al. (1998),
Berman et. al. (1998), Hollanders and Ter Weel (2002), Kahn and Lim (1998), and Machin and
Van Reenen (1998).
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same literature. In some of these models the labour market is a¤ected by search and
matching frictions. In others, the labour market is assumed to be competitive, failing
to o¤er an explanation for the persistence of unskilled unemployment. Moreover, the
majority of these models focus their analysis on extreme results (e.g. no di¤usion
vs. complete di¤usion of the innovative technology), and miss to provide practical
prescriptions for policy-making.
Our aim is to address these issues within a unique coherent framework. Thus, we
develop a model able to (i) identify the role of skill-biased technological change and
search and matching frictions in the determination of endogenous two-sided hetero-
geneity in the labour market, (ii) describe the strategic interaction between workers
and rms, and (iii) inform the policy-maker about the e¤ects of alternative forms of
intervention on the rate of unemployment, and on the degree of technological di¤u-
sion and economic expansion. We nd that subsidies to either education or innovation
both foster economic expansion, but generate ambiguous e¤ects on unemployment.
For this reason, the social planner must evaluate with attention the opportunity cost
of these two policies, as di¤erent economies might benet from di¤erent forms of
intervention.
The reminder of this paper is organised in ve sections. Section 2 outlines the
set-up of our framework. Section 3 describes the matching algorithm operating in
the labour market, and the process of production and distribution of output between
wages and prots. Section 4 focuses on the investment decisions in skill-acquisition
and technology adoption faced by workers and rms. Section 5 characterises the
macroeconomic outcomes in terms of unemployment, technological di¤usion, and eco-
nomic expansion. Section 6 provides a discussion of our ndings and concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy composed of a continuum of workers i 2 I and a continuum
of rms j 2 J of the same size: I  J  [0; 1].4 In the beginning, all rms produce
an identical nal good using the same technology. All workers are endowed with
the same skills, until a new and more productive technology is exogenously made
available in the economy. The introduction and the di¤usion of the new technology is
skill-biased, as the new technology can be operated only by workers who are endowed
with a su¢ cient amount of skills.
Firms decide whether to innovate and adopt the new hightechnology by pay-
ing a xed investment cost, or to retain the low-technology prole. The investment
decision of each rm is denoted by tj 2

tL; tH
	
, where tL and tH represent the two
available strategies: retaining the low-technology or investing in the high-technology.
4We assume that the number of workers is identical to the number of rms. This constitutes a
benchmark case where, potentially, each worker could be matched with a rm, and each rm could
be matched with a worker.
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On the opposite side of the labour market, workers decide whether to invest in a costly
skill-acquisition process, and gain the knowledge to operate the high-technology, or
to remain unskilled. The available strategies for each worker are represented by hi 2
fhus; hsg, where hus reects the decision to remain unskilled and hs represents the de-
cision of investing in skill-acquisition. At the end of the investment stage of the model,
a fraction of the labour force, , emerges has having invested in skill-acquisition and
a proportion, , of rms has having acquired the high-technology. Thus, the equilib-
rium distributions of skills and technologies (; ), are endogenously determined in
this economy. The proportion of workers investing in skill-acquisition is dened as:
 =
Z
i2I
[h (i) = hs] di (1)
and the proportion of rms investing in technology adoption is dened as:
 =
Z
j2J

t (j) = tH

dj (2)
where h (i) and t (j) denote the equilibrium investment decision of worker i and
rm j, respectively.
Each worker faces a specic cost of investment in skill-acquisition denoted by ci.
At the same time, each rm faces a specic cost of investment in technology adoption,
denoted by dj. Investment costs are uniformly distributed across agents, such that:
dj  U [0; D] and ci  U [0; C]. This means that every worker (every rm) can
acquire the same level of skills (the same innovative technology), but the investment
costs di¤er between workers (and between rms).
We assume that the education technology not explicitly modelled in this framework
generates congestion costs for workers investing in skill-acquisition activities. The
higher the number of workers investing in skill-acquisition, the higher the congestion
cost incurred by each worker. In particular, we assume that the congestion cost of
skill-acquisition for each worker is a quadratic function of the proportion of skilled
workers, such that: 2, with  > 0. At the same time, on the opposite side of the
labour market, also rms experience congestion costs in the process of technology
adoption as the price of the high-technology equipment increases with the demand
for innovation. Even in this case, we assume that the congestion cost of technology
adoption for each rm is a quadratic function of the number of innovating rms: 2,
with  > 0.
Investment decisions having been taken, workers and rms access the labour mar-
ket. The labour market is uncoordinated and a process of matching allows the two
sides of the labour market to meet, randomly allocating workers to rms. We assume
that each rm opens a single vacancy and employs a worker if s/he is able to operate
its technological equipment. In particular, we assume that skilled workers can operate
either the basic technology or the innovative technology, whereas unskilled workers
cannot operate the innovative technology. When an innovating (high-technology)
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rm is matched with a skilled worker, the match is productive because skilled work-
ers can operate the innovative technology. The match is also e¢ cient, because both
the worker and the rm can remunerate their investment by sharing a higher level
of output. If the innovating rm is matched with an unskilled worker the match is
not productive, because the worker is not able to operate the high-technology. In
this case, the match breaks immediately and the worker and the rm involved in this
match remain inactive. A rm retaining the old technological prole (low-technology)
can employ either a skilled or an unskilled worker. When an unskilled worker is as-
signed to a low-technology rm, the match is productive and e¢ cient. When a skilled
worker is assigned to a low-technology rm, the match is productive but not e¢ cient,
because the additional skills acquired by the worker cannot be employed to increase
the productivity of the low-technology. We refer to this case as a mismatch, since the
worker has invested resources in skill-acquisition, but receives the same wage of an
unskilled worker.5 Productively matched (and mismatched) worker-rm pairs bar-
gain over the proportion of nal output to be distributed between wages and prots
and engage in production.
The model articulates in two sequential stages. In the rst stage, agents take their
investment decisions and contribute to the formation of an endogenous distribution of
skills in the labour force and an endogenous distribution of technologies across rms.
In the second stage, agents enter the labour market, and the matching mechanism
allocates workers to rms a¤ecting the degree of technological di¤usion, economic
expansion, and unemployment. All the agents have common knowledge about the
parameters a¤ecting skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities, about the
matching process, and about the distribution rule.
We outline the main features of our model by moving backwards. In the follow-
ing section, we provide a more accurate description of the algorithms that regulate
matching, production, and distribution in this economy: the second stage of the
model. Subsequently, we present the analysis of the process of skill-acquisition and
technology adoption taking place at the rst stage.
3 Matching, production and distribution
When workers and rms access the labour market, their investment decisions, fhi gi2I
and

tj
	
j2J , have already been taken. Hence, the distribution of skills and technolo-
gies, (; ), is also determined. The labour market is not coordinated. Workers
ignore whether they are applying for a high-technology or for a low-technology job,
as well as rms cannot discriminate between applications received from skilled or un-
5This assumption could be relaxed, assuming that a low-technology rm matched with a skilled
worker displays higher productivity than a low-technology rm matched with an unskilled worker.
This extension is considered by Gautier (2002). Our fundamental results would not be signicantly
a¤ected by this extension.
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skilled workers. This information is revealed only after a match. Since the matching
process is anonymous, wages and prots can only be determined after a match is
formed.
3.1 Random matching
Each agent entering the labour market has to engage in search activities to nd a
compatible production partner. In this simple model, we assume that each worker
can apply to one rm only, and that each rm can consider the rst application
received only. We represent this process through a random matching algorithm that
allocates a worker to each rm.6 Denote with xi;j = (hi; tj) a generic worker-rm
pair. Each pair xi;j is characterised by a skill-technology prole that depends on the
investment decisions previously taken by the worker, hi, and the rm, tj, composing
the pair. In a randommatching conguration each worker-rm pair assumes a specic
skill-technology prole according to a stochastic rule. This rule associates a worker-
rm pair to a skill-technology prole with given probabilities. These probabilities
depend endogenously on the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers, and on the
proportion of high-technology and low-technology rms, determined at the rst stage
of the model.
Denition 3.1: Endogenous random matching conguration
Consider the set of all the possible worker-rm pairs: xi;j 2 (I  J) and their
associated skill-technology proles. An endogenous random matching congu-
ration M fxi;j; (; ) ; p(xi;j)g(i;j)2(IJ) is an allocation of one-to-one worker-
rm pairs induced by the distribution of skills and technologies (; ) and a
probability distribution over the skill-technology prole of each worker-rm pair,
such that: p
 
hus; tL

= (1   ) (1  ), p  hs; tL = (1   ), p  hs; tH =
, p
 
hus; tH

=  (1  ), for every xi;j 2 (I  J).
3.2 Production
For each worker-rm pair xi;j the outcome of the production process is determined
through a xed coe¢ cients production function yi;j = f (xi;j) that combines the skill-
technology prole of worker i and rm j to generate the nal output. We assume that
a rm retaining the low-technology prole produces one unit of output, independently
6Suppose that the names of all workers, skilled and unskilled, are placed in an urn and all
rmsidentication tags are placed in another urn. The random matching mechanism that we are
describing simultaneously draws workersnames and rmstags from the two urns and allocates a
workers name to a rms tag.
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from the skill-prole of its worker: yL
 
hus; tL

= yL
 
hs; tL

= 1.7 A rm investing
in the high-technology prole produces yH
 
hs; tH

=  > 1 units of output only
if matched with a skilled worker. If matched with an unskilled worker, the high-
technology rm cannot produce any output: yH
 
hus; tH

= 0.
3.3 Distribution
In a matching model, prices do not play any allocative or distributive role. Moreover,
workers and rms ignore what is the skill or technological prole of their production
partner until a match is formed. For this reason, workers and rms engage in the
bargaining and distribution problem only after a (successful) match has taken place.
As standard in the literature on random matching, we assume that workers and rms
bargain over the proportion of nal output to be allocated between wages, w, and
prots, , according to a Nash-bargaining scheme:(
Max
wi;j
(wi)
 (j)
1 
s:t: yi;j = wi + j
We denote with  2 (0; 1) the bargaining power of workers and we assume that
this parameter is exogenously given and identical for both skilled and unskilled work-
ers. The solution to this bargaining problem is a distribution of the nal output
produced by each worker-rm pair in proportions  and (1  ) to wages and prots,
respectively. Thus, the output produced by a high-technology rm, yH =  , is distrib-
uted as: wH =  and H = (1  ) . The output produced by a low-technology
rm, yL = 1, is distributed as: wL =  and L = (1  ).8
4 Investment decisions of workers and rms
Agents take their irreversible investment decisions at the rst stage of the model,
prior to accessing the labour market. Nevertheless, both workers and rms display a
forward-looking behaviour as they (i) form expectations about the matching outcome
emerging in the labour market, and (ii) have knowledge about the outcome of the
bargaining game, also taking place in the second stage of the model. Thus, workers
7This assumption could be relaxed, assuming that a low-technology rm matched with a skilled
worker displays higher productivity than a low-technology rm matched with an unskilled worker.
This feature is considered in Gautier (2002) However, our fundamental results would not be signi-
cantly a¤ected by this extension.
8An obvious extension to the model would be to allow  to vary between skilled and unskilled
workers. We note that there is an argument that the more specically skilled workers might be
expected to exert greater individual bargaining power. On the other hand, this might be o¤set by
greater collective bargaining of the less skilled workers. The non-cooperative model of bargaining,
associated with Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), implies that  is to be interpreted as a
discount rate: there is no necessary reason why this should vary systematically across sectors.
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and rms evaluate costs and benets of investing in skill-acquisition and technology
adoption. With regards to the benets emerging from investment in either skills or
technology, we have assumed that the bargaining power, , is identical and constant
for both skilled and unskilled workers. If we consider the productivity di¤erential be-
tween the high-technology and the low-technology: yH   yL =    1 we can observe
that the wage-di¤erential and the prot di¤erential paid by high-technology and low-
technology rms are both constant: ws wus =  (   1), H L = (1  ) (   1).
Nevertheless, each worker i and each rm j display a specic cost of investment in
skill-acquisition, ci, and technology di¤usion, dj. Moreover, the equilibrium pro-
portions of skilled workers and high-technology rms, (; ), a¤ect each agents
probability of nding a compatible production partner, and the congestion costs of
investment in skill-acquisition and technology adoption. Therefore, four elements
characterise the investment decision faced by each agent: wage (or prot) di¤eren-
tial, specic investment costs, congestion costs, and matching probabilities.
4.1 Skill-acquisition
We consider now the decision problem faced by a worker who has to determine his/her
desired amount of skills prior to entering the labour market. In the beginning all
workers are naturally endowed with an identical amount of human capital hus and
they are all unskilled. Workers can invest part of their income to increase their skill
endowment and qualify as skilled.9
Workers aim to acquire the skill-prole that maximises their expected net income.
The net income of each worker is computed as the di¤erence between the wage earned
and the investment costs associated with the workers skill-prole. If worker i decides
to invest in skill-acquisition, s/he incurs a specic cost of investment, ci and a conges-
tion cost 2, which is increasing in the proportion of other workers investing in skills.
In order to evaluate the expected wage, each worker forms beliefs about the distri-
butions of skills and technologies in the economy, (e; e). In this way, the worker
estimates the probability of being matched with either a high-technology rm, e, or
a low-technology rm, (1  e). Estimating the value e, the worker is also able to
form an expectation about the congestion cost of investing in skill-acquisition.
For a given conguration of beliefs over the distribution of skills and technologies
f(ei ; ei )gi2I , the payo¤ associated with the two investment strategies available to
each worker is identied by the following equations:
hi =

hs : Ei(U
s j(ei ; ei )) = eiwH + (1  ei )wL   ci   (ei )2
hus : Ei(U
us j(ei ; ei )) = (1  ei )wL
If the worker chooses to invest in skill-acquisition s/he expects to be matched
9We assume that, at the rst stage, workers can borrow the resources necessary to invest in
skill-acquisition at a rate zero. At the end of the second stage, workers receive their wage and re-pay
their investment costs. A similar assumptions holds for rms.
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with a high-technology rm with probability ei or with a low-technology rm with
probability (1  ei ), earning respectively wH =  or wL = . In this case, the
worker expects to face the investment costs ci+ (
e
i )
2. If worker i chooses to remain
unskilled, s/he expects to be matched with a low-technology rm with probability
(1  ei ) and earn the wage wL = , otherwise the worker will be unemployed.
Each worker maximises his/her expected income, given a conguration of beliefs
over the distribution of skills and technologies determined in the economy:
Max
hi2(hs;hus)
f Ei(U si j(ei ; ei )) ; Ei(Uusi j(ei ; ei ))g
We assume that workers form expectations about the distribution of skills and
technologies in the same way, so that: Ei(U si j(ei ; ei )) = E(U si j(e; e)) andEi(Uusi j(ei ; ei )) =
E(Uusi j(e; e)) for all i 2 I.
The decision rule adopted by each worker can be formalised as:
hi =

hs if E(U si j(e; e)) > E(Uusi j(e; e))
hus if E(U si j(e; e)) < E(Uusi j(e; e))
Therefore, substituting the equilibrium value of wages paid by high-technology
rms and low-technology rms, a worker will invest in skill-acquisition activities if:
ci  e    (e)2  c (e; e) (3)
Condition (3) implies that each worker compares his/her specic cost of invest-
ment in skill-acquisition with a threshold cost c (e; e), which depends on his/her
beliefs over the distribution of skills and technologies in the economy. If the worker
expects more rms to invest in the high-technology s/he also expects that it is easier
to be matched with a high-technology vacancy: the estimated threshold cost c is
lower. Conversely, if the worker expects more workers to invest in skill-acquisition,
the estimated cost of congestion is higher and the estimated threshold cost c is also
higher.
We assumed that the costs of investment in skill-acquisition are uniformly distrib-
uted as: ci  U [0; C]. From condition (3) we know that all the workers who display
an investment cost lower than the threshold value c will invest in skill-acquisition.
Therefore, the proportion of skilled workers (1) can be expressed as:
 =
1
C
Z c
0
di = W (e; e) (4)
Relation (4) is obtained by integrating over the distribution of investment costs of
all the workers who display an investment cost lower than or equal tothe threshold
value c (e; e). We can interpret relation (4) by observing that workers form an
expectation about congestion externalities generated by potential competitors in the
labour market. At the same time, workers contribute to generate congestion external-
ities with their own investment decision. This determines a correspondence between
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the expected proportion of skilled workers on the right-hand sideand the actual
proportion of skilled workers generated in the economy. For any given expected pro-
portion of innovating rms e, the equilibrium proportion of skilled workers is identi-
ed by the x-point value  = e, where the expectations of all workers are mutually
consistent. Hence, imposing a consistency condition on the beliefs of workers:
 = W (; e) (5)
Solving (5), we can express the actual proportion of skilled workers, R, as a
function of workersexpected proportion of innovating rms, e:
R = R (e) = min
(
 C +
p
C2 + 4 e
2
; 1
)
(6)
Equation (6) summarises the response of workers to the di¤usion of the new tech-
nology. It is easy to observe that when no rm invests in the new technology, no
worker acquires skills, so that: R (e = 0) = 0. On the other hand, the response
function R (e) has to be bounded to 1 above. This happens because, under par-
ticular parameterisations of the economy, all workers invest in skill-acquisition, even
when the expected proportion of innovating rms is lower than one (and the di¤usion
of the high-technology is not complete).10 The following proposition characterises its
properties:
Proposition 4.1
The skill-upgrading response function R (e) is:
(i) increasing and concave in the expected proportion of high-technology rms,
e;
(ii) decreasing in the cost of investment in skill-acquisition, C, and of the
congestion cost parameter, ;
(iii) increasing in the productivity of the high-technology,  , and in the bargain-
ing power of workers, .
Consider Property (i) of Proposition 4.1. For any expected proportion of high-
technology rms, each worker estimates the expected income associated with the
choice of investing in skill-acquisition and with the choice of remaining unskilled.
10From a technical point of view, the value
 C+
p
C2+4 e
2 can be greater than one for particular
congurations fC; ; ;  g and e < 1: For these cases, we restrict the skill-upgrading response
function, R (e), to assume value 1. The proportion of skilled workers will assume value 1, even
when the di¤usion of the high-technology is not complete.
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The higher the expected proportion of high-technology rms, the higher the estimated
probability of being matched with a high-technology vacancy. Thus, if more rms are
expected to invest in the high-technology, more workers invest in skill-acquisition ac-
tivities. The skill and technology complementarity introduced in the model generates
strategic complementarity between the investment decisions of workers and rms.
Nevertheless, each worker is also aware that a higher number of innovating rms
induces a higher proportion of skilled workers, increasing the congestion costs in
skill-acquisition. Therefore, as a second order e¤ect, congestion externalities become
stronger and reduce the incentive to invest in skill-acquisition. The higher the ex-
pected proportion of innovating rms, the stronger the second order e¤ect generated
by congestion costs in skill-acquisition, the lower the aggregate response of work-
ers investing in skill-acquisition. Therefore, investment decisions in skill-acquisition
are strategic complements across the two sides of the labour market, but strate-
gic substitutes within the workers side of the labour market. As a consequence,
the skill-upgrading response function is increasing in the expected number of high-
technology rms, but less than proportionally. The intuition for properties (ii) and
(iii) is straightforward: an increase in the specic cost of investment, or in the con-
gestion cost parameter, discourages workers from acquiring skills. On the other hand,
an increase in workersbargaining power, or in the output to be shared between wages
and prots, constitute a further incentive to skill-acquisition.
4.2 Technology adoption
The description of rmsinvestment behaviour is analogous to the analysis conducted
on workers. To evaluate their expected net prot, rms form beliefs about the dis-
tribution of skills and technologies in the economy, (e; e). Each rm estimates the
probability of being matched with either a skilled worker, e, or with an unskilled
worker, (1  e).
For a given conguration of beliefs over the distribution of skills and technologies
(e; e), each rm faces a choice between investing in technology adoption or retaining
the low-technology prole. The net prot associated with either investment decision
is identied by the following equations:
tj =

tH : Ej
 
Hj
 ej ; ej = ejH   dj   (ej)2
tL : Ej
 
Lj
 ej ; ej = L
Firms retaining the low technology prole are aware that they are going to be
matched with either a skilled or unskilled worker. In both cases they would be able
to produce the output yL = 1 and gain, as prot, the output share L = (1  ).
A rm j that invests in technology adoption expects to be matched with a skilled
worker with probability ej . In this case the rm would be able to produce the output
yH =  and earn the prot share H = (1  ) . If a high-technology rm j is
matched with an unskilled worker, with estimated probability
 
1  ej

, the skill-
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technology prole of the match is not compatible for production and both the rm
and the worker remain inactive. Each rm j adopting the high-technology incurs a
total cost of innovation dj + 2.
Firms maximise their expected income by choosing a technological prole associ-
ated with the higher payo¤. Thus, given a conguration of beliefs about the distrib-
ution of skills and technologies that is going to be determined in the economy:
Max
tj2ftH ;tLg

Ej
 
Hj
 ej ; ej ; Ej  Lj  ej ; ej	
As in the case of workers, we assume that all rms form expectations about the
distribution of skills and technologies in the same way, so that: Ej
 
Hj
 ej ; ej =
E
 
Hj j(e; e)

and Ej
 
Lj
 ej ; ej = E  Lj j(e; e) for all j 2 J .
The decision rule adopted by each rm is formalised as:
tj =

tH if E
 
Hj j(e; e)

> E
 
Lj j(e; e)

tL if E
 
Hj j(e; e)

< E
 
Lj j(e; e)

Therefore, substituting the equilibrium value of prots gained by high-technology
rms and low-technology rms, a rm will innovate if:
dj < 
e (1  ) (   1)   (e)2  d (e; e) (7)
Condition (7) states that each rm compares its specic cost of investment in
technology adoption with a threshold cost, d (e; e). The threshold cost depends
on the rms beliefs over the distribution of skills and technologies in the economy.
If more skilled workers are expected to enter the labour market, each rm expects
that it is easier to be matched with a skilled worker. Therefore, the estimated thresh-
old cost d is lower. Nevertheless, if a rm expects many other rms to adopt the
high-technology, the rm also expects facing higher congestion costs. Therefore, the
estimated threshold cost d is higher.
The distribution of investment costs in technology adoption is uniform over the
interval [0; D]. From condition (7), all the rms displaying an investment cost lower
than the threshold value d will invest in technology adoption. Thus, the proportion
of high-technology rms (2) can be expressed as:
 =
1
D
Z d
0
dj = F (e; e) (8)
For any given expected proportion of skilled workers e, the equilibrium pro-
portion of high-technology rms is identied by the x-point value  = e, where
the expectations of all rms are mutually consistent. Thus, imposing a consistency
condition on the beliefs of rms:
 = F (e; ) (9)
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Solving (8), we can express the proportion of innovating rms, R, as a function
of rmsexpected proportion of skilled workers, e:
R = R (e) = min
(
 D +pD2 + 4 (1  ) (   1)e
2
; 1
)
(10)
Equation (10) relates the degree of di¤usion of the high-technology to workers
skill-acquisition activities. The properties of this relationship are summarised by the
following proposition:
Proposition 4.2
The innovation response function R (e) is:
(i) increasing and concave in rmsexpected proportion of skilled workers e;
(ii) decreasing in the cost of investment in technology adoption, D, of the
congestion cost parameter, , and of the bargaining power of workers, ;
(iii) increasing in the productivity of the high-technology,  .
The interpretation of the properties of Proposition 4.2 is analogous to the one
provided for Proposition 4.1. Property (i) states that for any expected proportion of
skilled workers, each rm estimates the expected income associated with the choice
of investing in technology adoption and to the choice of retaining the low-technology
prole. The higher the expected proportion of skilled workers, the higher the esti-
mated probability of being productively matched to a skilled worker. Thus, if more
workers are expected to acquire skills, more rms invest in technology adoption. How-
ever, the higher the expected number of other rms investing in the new technology,
the higher the congestion costs of technology adoption faced by each rm. Therefore,
the innovation response function is increasing in the expected proportion of skilled
workers because of the e¤ect of strategic complementarities across the two sides of
the labour market. Moreover, the innovation response function is concave because
of the e¤ect of strategic substitutability within the rmsside of the labour market.
Property (ii) of Proposition 4.2 states that increases in the cost of investment and
in the congestion parameter , as well as increase in workersbargaining power, dis-
courage rms from investing in technology adoption. On the other hand, an increase
in the productivity of the high-technology increases the prot-share for rms and
generates a further incentive to innovate.
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5 Equilibrium distributions of skills and technolo-
gies
In the previous section we have derived the skill-upgrading response function, R (e),
and the innovation response function, R (e), under the assumption that agents be-
longing to the same side of the labour market form consistent expectations on the
distribution of skills and technologies. In equilibrium, not only are agentsexpecta-
tions consistent within the same side of the labour market, but they are also consistent
across the two sides of the labour market. Thus, the equilibrium conguration of in-
vestment decisions in skills and technology is summarised by the following denition:
Denition 5.1: Equilibrium
Given an economy 
 = f;  ; ; ; C;Dg, an equilibrium for the economy is a
conguration:D
fhi gi2I ;

tj
	
j2J ; (
; ) ;M fxi;j; (; ) ; p(xi;j)g(i;j)2(IJ)
E
, such that:
(i) hi = argmax
hi2fhs;husg
fE [Uij (; )]g for all i 2 I
tj = argmax
tj2ftH ;tLg
fE [jj (; )]g for all j 2 J
(ii) R () =  and R () = :
In equilibrium, agents take investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technol-
ogy adoption that maximise their expected payo¤s. Moreover, workersexpectations
about the equilibrium proportion of high-technology rms, as well as rmsexpec-
tations about the equilibrium proportion of skilled workers, are mutually consistent.
Agentsexpectations are mutually consistent when the skill-upgrading response func-
tion crosses the innovation response function. At the crossing point (; ) the ex-
pectation formed by workers is fullled by the actual proportion of innovating rms
and the expectation formed by rms is fullled by the actual proportion of skilled
workers. This situation is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows that, in the most general case, our model generates two equilibria:
an unstable equilibrium, located in (0; 0), and a stable equilibrium, located in point
E = (; ). The position of equilibrium E is determined by the slope and the
degree of concavity of the two response functions. The slope of each response func-
tion measures the strength of the strategic complementarity between workersand
rmsinvestment decisions, whereas the concavity of the response functions reects
the strength of strategic substitutability between investment decisions within either
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Figure 1: Equilibrium distributions of skills and technologies.
side of the labour market. The slope and the concavity of each response function are
a¤ected by the fundamental parameters of the model: the distribution of investment
costs, the congestion cost parameters, the productivity of the high-technology and the
bargaining power of workers. Thus, according to parameter values, the equilibrium
E can be located anywhere in the (; ) space, including cases where the proportion
of skilled workers is signicantly higher or signicantly lower than the proportion of
high-technology rms. This represents, in our opinion, an interesting feature of the
equilibrium derived by our model. In fact, in related literature, the few contribu-
tions that endogenise simultaneously the distribution of skills and the distribution of
technologies are developed as a pure-coordination game, where agents belonging to
the same side of the market take the same investment decisions. Thus, the typical
coordination problem described by this kind of models generates two equilibria in
which if all workers invest in skills all rms invest in technology and if no worker
invests in skills no rm invests in technology. This type of conguration, implies
that equilibrium unemployment is entirely frictional, because agents entering in the
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labour market display always compatible skill-technology prole.11 In our model,
instead, there can be substantial imbalances between the equilibrium distributions
of skills and technologies. Therefore unemployment cannot be classied as an ex-
clusively frictional phenomenon. Since ex-ante agents investment decisions a¤ect
the determination of the skill-technology prole of each worker-rm matched pair,
the outcome of the matching mechanism operating in the labour market displays a
structural component in our model.
The comparison of our results with those derived in the related literature uncov-
ers another point of strength of our approach. The majority of models presented
in related literature are based on pure-coordination games where agents belonging
to the same side of the labour market take identical investment decisions and all
agents belonging to the opposite side of the labour market coordinate on the cor-
responding appropriate investment response. Thus, in equilibrium, the economy is
always composed of a single sector: a low-technology sector, if nobody invests, or a
high-technology sector, where everybody invests. The two technologies never operate
simultaneously in the economy.12 In our model, instead, agentsinvestment decisions
in skill-acquisition and technology adoption can di¤er in equilibrium. Therefore, in
the most general case, the economy is composed of two sectors, one producing with
the low-technology and one producing with the high-technology.
6 Labour market performance, unemployment, and
economic expansion
In the previous two sections we have described how workers and rms take their
investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption prior to accessing
the labour market. This analysis has characterised the rst stage of the model,
providing microeconomic foundations to the behaviour of agents. In this section
we focus on the second stage of the model, and we examine the macroeconomic
implications of our analysis.
6.1 The analysis of unemployment
When workers and rms have made their investment decision in skill-acquisition
and technology adoption, the equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and high-
technology rms, (; ), emerge endogenously in our economy. At this stage, work-
ers and rms enter the labour market. Skilled workers can be productively matched
11For instance, in the no-investment equilibrium, all workers are unskilled and all rms retain the
low-technology and in the investment equilibrium all workers are skilled and all rms have adopted
the high-technology.
12In Acemoglu (1997), heterogeneity in the distribution of skills and technology characterises the
transition dynamics, but not the equilibrium outcome. In Redding (1996) not even the dynamics of
the model are a¤ected by heterogeneity.
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with either high-technology or low-technology rms. Conversely, unskilled workers
cannot operate the innovative high-technology. Thus, when an unskilled worker is
matched with a high-technology rm, the match breaks immediately. According to
this algorithm, the rate of (unskilled) unemployment in this economy corresponds to
the proportion of unskilled workers matched with high-technology rms:
u = (1  ) (11)
The rate of unemployment is zero if no rm invests in the new technology, or if all
workers are skilled. The same rate of unemployment, u, can be generated by di¤erent
combinations of equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and high-technology rms
(; ), belonging to the same iso-unemployment relationship:
Denition 6.1
The iso-unemployment relationship IU (u) is the locus dened by all the cong-
urations of equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and high-technology rms
(; ) that generate the same level of unemployment, u:
Therefore: IU (u) = f(; ) : (1  ) = ug.
The following proposition summarises the fundamental properties of the iso-unemployment
relationships:
Proposition 6.1
For any given conguration of equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and
high-technology rms, (; ), and associated unemployment rate, u, the iso-
unemployment relationships IU (u) = f(; ) : (1  ) = ug are:
(i) positively sloped in the (; ) space: d

d

(;)2IU(u)
> 0;
(ii) convex in the (; ) space: d
2
d2

(;)2IU(u)
> 0.
Turning to the interpretation of the results of Proposition 6.1,
When the economy experiences a wave of technological change, the proportion
of high-technology rms increases. This promotes Neo-Schumpeterian creative de-
struction, increasing the number of unproductive matches in the labour market and
generating unskilled unemployment. Thus, in order to neutralise the negative ef-
fects of creative destruction, the proportion of skilled workers must also increase.
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Property (i) of Proposition 6.1 captures this fact and states that, for any given dis-
tribution (; ), the slope of the iso-unemployment relationship represents the rate
of substitution between the proportion of skilled workers and the proportion of high-
technology rms that holds unemployment constant. Moreover, the matching process
in the labour market occurs at random. Thus, heterogeneities in the distributions of
skills and technologies cause frictions in the process of allocation of workers to rms.
Suppose that there are not many skilled workers looking for a job. If the propor-
tion of innovating rms increases, an equivalent increase in the proportion of skilled
workers would not be enough to maintain the overall rate of unemployment constant.
A number of additional skilled workers would be mismatched with low-technology
rms, and a proportion of unskilled workers would be unsuccessfully matched with
high-technology rms, generating more unemployment. Therefore, the proportion of
skilled workers has to increase more than the proportion of high-technology rms in
order to maintain a constant level of unemployment. In this case, a larger increment
in the proportion of skilled workers balances out two phenomena: (i) an increase in
the proportion of high-technology vacancies, (ii) plus an increase in the number of
mismatches generated by the anonymous random matching process. Property (ii) of
Proposition 6.1 states that, in our model, the same increment in the proportion of
innovating rms generates more unemployment in an economy where the proportion
of skilled workers is small, and less unemployment if the proportion of skilled workers
is large.
Consider now the conguration of parameters that characterises the economy:

 = f;  ; ; C; ;Dg. Suppose one were to bring a marginal change to one of these
parameters and analyse the impact on the unemployment outcome u. Evidently, a
change in any of the fundamental parameters of the economy alters the equilibrium
distributions of skills and technologies, triggering a change in the equilibrium alloca-
tion of workers to rms and in the unemployment outcome. Using denition (11), for
a small variation of any k 2 
, the impact on unemployment can be decomposed in
the following way:
du
dk
=
d
dk
(1  )  d

dk
 (12)
The rst term of equation (12) measures the creative destruction e¤ect as the
change in the proportion of high-technology rms. Holding constant the propor-
tion of unskilled workers, a positive creative destruction e¤ect generates more unem-
ployment because each unskilled worker has higher probability to be unproductively
matched with a high-technology rm. The second term of equation (12) denes the
skill-upgrading e¤ect, which quanties the change in the proportion of skilled workers.
Holding constant the proportion of high-technology rms, a positive skill-upgrading
e¤ect contributes to reduce the rate of unemployment because the number of produc-
tive matches increases. The total e¤ect on the unemployment rate depends: (i) on
the combination of the creative destruction e¤ect and the skill-upgrading e¤ect, and
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(ii) on the initial equilibrium distributions of skills and technologies (; ).
Re-arranging the terms of equation (12), Proposition 6.2 characterises the sign of
the change in the unemployment outcome.
Proposition 6.2
Consider an economy 
, and its associated equilibrium distribution of skills
and technologies, (; ). For a marginal change in any of the parameters,
k 2 
, the sign of the change in rate of unemployment, du, can be determined
comparing the relative strength of the creative destruction e¤ect and of the skill-
upgrading e¤ect with the slope of the the iso-unemployment relationship IU(u)
evaluated at the initial equilibrium, (; ). Therefore:
(i) if d

dk
> 0 : d
=dk
d=dk >

(1 ) =) du

dk
> 0;
(ii) if d

dk
< 0 : d
=dk
d=dk >

(1 ) =) du

dk
< 0.
Properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.2 characterise the impact of a change in
any parameter of the economy, k, on the unemployment rate. To provide further
intuitions about this characterisation, we discuss the example displayed in Figure 2.
Following a change in any parameter, k, the skill-upgrading response function
R1 (
e) shifts to position R2 (
e). At the same time, the innovation response function
shifts from R1 (
e) to R2 (
e). The conguration of equilibrium proportions of skilled
workers and high technology rms changes from E1 to E2, and the variation of these
equilibrium proportions is measured by d and d. Thus, the ratio d=d pro-
vides information about the number of new high-technology vacancies created per
additional skilled worker, and corresponds to the left-hand side of the inequalities
presented in properties (i) and (ii). The right-hand side of these inequalities, in-
stead, represents the slope of the iso-unemployment relationship IU (u) evaluated at
the initial equilibrium E1. As discussed above, the slope of the iso-unemployment
relationship determines the number of high-technology rms necessary to compensate
the entry of an additional skilled worker in the labour market to preserve the rate of
unemployment constant. In the case represented in Figure 2, both the skill-upgrading
e¤ect and the creative destruction e¤ect display a positive sign and, according to
equation (12), they compete against each other in a¤ecting unemployment. Never-
theless, employing Property (i) of Proposition 6.2, we can observe that the response
of workers and rms to a change in parameter k generates an additional number
of high-technology vacancies per skilled worker that is lower than the slope of the
iso-unemployment relationship IU (u) at the initial equilibrium. In other words, the
creation of additional high-technology vacancies increases the risk of unemployment
for each unskilled worker, but the number of these workers is substantially reduced.
Thus, in the new equilibrium E2, the labour market generates a number of unsuccess-
ful matches that is lower than the one generated by the equilibrium E1. In Figure
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Figure 2: Comparative statics on unemployment.
2, we can observe that the new equilibrium conguration E2 is located below the
iso-unemployment IU (u), such that u2 (

2; 

2) < u. The rate of unemployment is
lower.
The left-hand side of properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.2 reects Stage 1
of the model the ex-ante stagewhen investment decisions are taking place. The
right-hand side corresponds to Stage 2 of the model the ex-post stagewhen workers
and rms have entered the labour market, and the matching mechanism allocates
workers to rms. Thus, given an initial equilibrium allocation E1, we can observe that
the criterion presented in Proposition 6.2 is based on the comparison between how
agents react to a change in the parametric conguration, and how the labour market
performance responds to this change. Using this result, the following propositions
summarise the e¤ect of a change in the fundamental parameters of the economy on
the unemployment rate. We are particularly interested in investigating the e¤ects of
policies aimed at reducing the costs of investment in skill-upgrading and innovation,
which are described in Proposition 6.3 and Proposition 6.4, respectively. Proposition
6.5 describes the e¤ect of the alteration of workersbargaining power.
21
Proposition 6.3
Consider an economy 
, its equilibrium distribution of skills and technologies,
(; ), and its associated unemployment rate, u. If the equilibrium congura-
tion (; ) displays a su¢ ciently high (low) proportion of skilled workers, ,
and high-technology rms, , a reduction in the investment cost parameter, C,
or in the congestion cost parameter, , generates a reduction (increase) in the
unemployment rate. In particular:
(i) @
R()
@

(;)
< 1 and  > 1   =)  du
dC
< 0;
(ii) @
R()
@

(;)
> 1 and  < 1   =)  du
dC
> 0;
(iii) In all the other cases, a reduction in the costs of investment in technology
adoption displays an ambiguous e¤ect on the unemployment rate.
Proposition 6.3 considers the e¤ect of interventions aimed at reducing the costs
of investment in skill-acquisition. We focus the discussion of this proposition on
Property (i), as the intuition for Property (ii) can be derived following an analogous
reasoning. The e¤ects of a reduction of the investment costs parameters, C or , a¤ect
only the skill-upgrading response function, leaving unchanged the innovation response
function. The skill-upgrading response function shifts right (e.g. from R1 (
e) to
R2 (
e) in Figure 2) because, for any given expectation of being productively matched
with a high-technology rm e, lower costs of investment incentivise more workers
investing in skill-acquisition. The innovation response function does not shift, as the
costs of investment in skill-acquisition do not directly a¤ect the investment decisions
of rms. Nevertheless, rms expect that more skilled workers will enter the labour
market, and estimate an increase in the probability of a productive match with a
skilled worker. This expectation triggers an increase in the number of rms adopting
the high-technology as a second order e¤ect. Both the equilibrium proportions of
skilled workers and high-technology rms increase in the new equilibrium. Therefore,
both the creative destruction e¤ect and the skill-upgrading e¤ect display a positive
sign, and generate competing e¤ects on unemployment. In the most general case,
the nal e¤ect on unemployment is ambiguous.13 Property (i) of Proposition 6.3
identies two su¢ cient conditions to resolve this ambiguity. In fact, (i) when the
congestion externalities generated by technology adoption activities are su¢ ciently
strong, and (ii) when the number of innovating rms is higher than the number of
unskilled workers at the initial equilibrium E1, a reduction of the costs of investment
in skill-acquisition determines a reduction of equilibrium unemployment. Note that
13Taking as reference the diagram represented in Figure 2, this means that the equilibrium con-
guration E2 could be located either above or below the iso-unemployment relationship IU (u).
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these two conditions are both satised when the initial proportions of skilled workers
and innovating rms are su¢ ciently high.
Proposition 6.4
Consider an economy 
, its equilibrium distribution of skills and technologies,
(; ), and its associated unemployment rate, u. If the equilibrium congura-
tion (; ) displays a su¢ ciently low (high) proportion of skilled workers, ,
and high-technology rms, , a reduction in the investment cost parameter, D,
or in the congestion cost parameter, , generates a reduction (increase) in the
unemployment rate under the following conditions:
(i) @
R()
@

(;)
> 1 and  > 1   =)  du
dD
< 0;
(ii) @
R()
@

(;)
< 1 and  < 1   =)  du
dD
> 0;
(iii) In all the other cases, a reduction in the costs of investment in technology
adoption determines ambiguous e¤ects on the unemployment rate.
Proposition 6.4 considers the e¤ects of interventions aimed at reducing the costs of
investment in technology adoption. In this case, the innovation response function is
expected to shift up, whereas the skill-upgrading response function is not a¤ected by
this policy. The intuition for the properties of this proposition is based on analogous
reasoning to the one conducted for Proposition 6.2. For this reason, we do not discuss
these results in detail and we proceed, instead, to analyse the e¤ects of a modication
of workersbargaining power.
Proposition 6.5
Consider an economy 
, its equilibrium distribution of skills and technologies,
(; ), and its associated unemployment rate, u. A change in workersbar-
gaining power, , determines an unambiguous e¤ect on the unemployment rate
if the creative destruction e¤ect and the skill-upgrading e¤ect display opposite
sign. In particular:
(i) d

d
> 0 and d

d
< 0 =) du
d
< 0.
(ii)  d
d
< 0 and  d
d
> 0 =)  du
d
> 0.
(iii) In all the other cases, a change in workersbargaining power determines
ambiguous e¤ects on unemployment.
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Proposition 6.5 provides a characterisation of the e¤ects of policies aimed at al-
tering the distribution rule that allocates the nal output of each rm between wages
and prots. As in propositions 6.3 and 6.4, this characterisation builds on the cri-
terion introduced by Proposition 6.2. Nevertheless, the analysis of a change in pa-
rameter  is slightly more complicated as this parameter a¤ects directly both the
skill-upgrading response function and the innovation response function. A variation
in workersbargaining power, , can generate (i) either an increase or a decrease
in the equilibrium proportion of skilled workers,  and, at the same time, (ii) ei-
ther an increase or a decrease in the equilibrium proportion of high-technology rms,
. This twofold ambiguity is originated by the interaction of a direct e¤ect and of
an indirect strategic e¤ect. Consider, for instance, an increase in workersbargain-
ing power, . The increase in the wage paid to skilled workers generates a direct
positive e¤ect on workersinvestment decisions in skill-acquisition. This e¤ect alone
would cause an increase in the proportion of skilled workers. On the other side of
the labour market, though, rmsinvestment decisions are a¤ected by a direct neg-
ative e¤ect, as their prot-share is reduced. This negative e¤ect alone would reduce
the proportion of high-technology rms. Nevertheless, indirect strategic e¤ects have
also to be considered. If workers expect a signicant drop in the proportion of high-
technology rms, they also estimate a much lower probability of being productively
matched with a high-technology rm. This expectation could discourage investment
in skill-acquisition. Thus, combining the direct e¤ect and the indirect strategic ef-
fect, the proportion of skilled workers could either increase or decrease in the new
equilibrium. At the same time, on the opposite side of the labour market, the deter-
mination of the new equilibrium proportion of high-technology rms is also a¤ected
by the combination of the direct e¤ect on expected earnings and the indirect e¤ect on
expected matching probabilities. However, properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.5
conrm that, when the changes in the equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and
high-technology rms display an opposite sign, policy-intervention on the bargaining
parameter, , displays unambiguous e¤ects on unemployment.
To conclude, we observe that proposition 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5, provide information
to the policy-maker about how the performance of the labour market is a¤ected by
changes in agents investment decisions through changes in the composition of the
labour force, and in the distribution of technologies across rms. The characterisation
o¤ered by these three propositions is restricted to a limited number of cases, where
the e¤ect of a change in any of the fundamental parameters of the economy on unem-
ployment is predictable ex-ante. The source of ambiguity arising in all the other cases
is twofold. First, one has to consider the direct impact of a change in the economys
parameters on the position, the slope, and the degree of concavity of the response
functions. Second, adding the indirect e¤ects caused by strategic complementarities
and substitutabilities, one can gather information about the relative changes in the
composition of the labour force and in the distribution of technologies across rms. It
is important to emphasize that, in this model, the performance of the labour market
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depends on the initial proportion of skilled workers and high-technology rms. This
feature implies that, in the most general case, the adoption of the same policy (e.g.
a reduction of the cost of investment in skill-acquisition) can display di¤erent e¤ects
on the rate of unemployment of two di¤erent economies, depending on their initial
distribution of skills and technologies.
6.2 Economic expansion
In this section we focus on the e¤ects of the introduction and the di¤usion of the inno-
vative high-technology on aggregate production. We organise our analysis following
the same structure adopted for the case of unemployment. First, we focus on the re-
lationship between labour market performance and economic expansion (the second
stage of the model). Then, we work our way back to the rst stage of the model to
describe how a change in the parametric conguration of the economy impacts on the
equilibrium distributions of skills and technologies and on economic expansion.
We begin our analysis assuming that an initial equilibrium conguration (; )
has emerged in the labour market. Our reference framework is static and, for this
reason, it does not allow for a description of the dynamics of aggregate output over
the path of technological di¤usion. To construct a measure of economic expansion,
we consider a benchmark economy where workers are all unskilled, and rms all
operate the low-technology equipment. Thus, we compare economies experiencing
technological di¤usion with this benchmark case.
After the introduction of the skill-biased high-technology, and the determination
of the equilibrium matching allocation, the economy produces the nal good through
two di¤erent technologies. Out of the overall proportion of high-technology rms, ,
only a fraction, , of this group of rms is productively matched with a skilled
worker. Each of these rms produces  > 1 units of output. Low-technology rms
are productively matched with either a skilled or an unskilled worker and produce
one unit of output in either case. The aggregate production of the whole economy is:
Y  =  + (1  ) (13)
The rst term of equation (13) represents the contribution to aggregate production
of the high-technology sector, while the second term measures the contribution of
the low-technology sector. The proportion of high-technology rms, , denes the
size of the high-technology sector and of the low-technology sector of the economy.
The proportion of skilled workers, , a¤ects the number of productive matches in
the high-technology sector. The aggregate production of the benchmark economy
which is characterised by low-prole matches onlyis Y0 = 1. Thus, compared to
the benchmark case, we can dene the degree of economic expansion of an economy
experiencing technological di¤usion as:
Y  = Y    Y0 =  (   1) (14)
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The maximum degree of economic expansion that an economy can achieve corre-
sponds to the case of complete di¤usion of the high-technology and complete skill-
upgrading in the labour force: Y (=1;=1) =    1, which is the productivity dif-
ferential between the high-technology and the low-technology. From equation (14),
we can immediately derive the following result:
Proposition 6.6
For a su¢ ciently high proportion of skilled workers and/or for a su¢ ciently
high productivity of the high-technology, technological di¤usion generates an
economic expansion. Otherwise, technological di¤usion generates an economic
contraction. More precisely:  > 1
 
() Y  > 0.
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. If the proportion of skilled
workers is su¢ ciently high the number of successful matches between innovating rms
and skilled workers increases signicantly. At the same time, if the productivity of
the innovative technology is su¢ ciently high, the contribution of the high-technology
sector to aggregate production is also high. Under these circumstances, the contri-
bution to aggregate production generated by the high-technology sector is su¢ cient
to outweigh the loss in production caused by unsuccessful matches between unskilled
workers and high-technology rms. However, if the conditions of Proposition 6.6 are
not satised, we can register positive correlation between technological di¤usion and
economic contraction. This eventuality represents an extreme case, and it is driven
by the assumption that the matching mechanism taking place in the labour market is
completely anonymous. Nevertheless, it is important to remark that, in an economy
characterised by labour market frictions and skill and technology complementarities,
technological di¤usion does not automatically generate economic expansion. What
really matters is the number of high-prole productive matches, not just the number
of rms adopting the new technology.
Given an equilibrium distribution of skills and technologies, (; ), the labour
market generates an endogenous matching allocation that sustains a particular level
of aggregate production, Y , and a corresponding degree of economic expansion (or
contraction), Y . The same degree of economic expansion could be generated by
alternative distributions of skills and technologies belonging to the same iso-expansion
relationship, whose properties are summarised in Proposition 6.7.
Denition 6.2
The iso-expansion relationship IE
 
Y

is the locus dened by all the congu-
rations of equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and high-technology rms,
(; ), that generate the same level of economic expansion (or contraction),
Y . Therefore: IE
 
Y

=

(; ) :  (   1) = Y 	.
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Proposition 6.7
For any initial conguration of equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and
high-technology rms, (; ), and the associated level of economic expansion,
Y , the iso-expansion relationships IE
 
Y

=

(; ) :  (   1) = Y 	
are:
(i) increasing in the (; ) space, if the economy experiences a contraction:
 < 1
 
=) d
d

(;)2IE(Y )
> 0;
(ii) decreasing in the (; ) space, if the economy experiences an expansion:
 > 1
 
=) d
d

(;)2IE(Y )
< 0;
(iii) convex in the (; ) space: d
2
d2

(;)2IE(Y )
> 0.
According to the properties of Proposition 6.7, the iso-expansion relationships can
be represented on the (; ) space as a set of increasing and convex curves for  < 1
 
,
and as a set of decreasing and convex curves for  > 1
 
, as displayed in Figure 3.14
Properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.7 characterise the slopes of the iso-contraction
and iso-expansion relationships. The slopes of these two relationships depend on three
fundamental factors: (i) the productivity of the high-technology,  , (ii) the features
of the matching technology, and (iii) the assumption of skill, and technology com-
plementarity. In the case of economic contraction, an increase in the proportion of
high-technology rms can only be counter-balanced by an increase in the proportion
of skilled workers. Otherwise, the amount of frictions generated by the matching
mechanism would cause a further loss in aggregate production. Therefore, the slope
of the iso-contraction relationships is positive. In the case of economic expansion,
an increase in the proportion of high-technology rms would still generate a higher
number of mismatches and unproductive matches in the labour market. Neverthe-
less, the productivity of the high-technology is su¢ ciently high to boost an overall
increase in aggregate production by employing more resources in the high-technology
sector of the economy. In these circumstances, in order to preserve the same level of
aggregate production, the proportion of skilled workers should be reduced. Thus the
iso-expansion relationships display a negative slope.
14The iso-expansion curves in Figure 3 are ranked from the most severe degree of economic
contraction,  Y
1
, to the highest degree of economic expansion, +Y
6
. In the case of  = 1 the
economy generates the same level of aggregate production of the benchmark case, so: Y  = Y0, and
Y  = 0.
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Figure 3: Iso-expansion relationships.
Property (iii) of Proposition 6.7 characterises the shape of the iso-contraction
and iso-expansion relationships, which depends on the characteristics of the matching
mechanism, as we have already noted discussing the convexity of the iso-unemployment
relationships. In analogy with the analysis of unskilled unemployment, we remark
that, also in this case, for a given level of productivity  , the degree of convexity of
the iso-contraction and of the iso-expansion relationships provides information about
the performance of the matching mechanism for alternative equilibrium distributions
of skills and technologies, (; ). This measure can be used to evaluate how the
labour market substitutes innovating rms with skilled workers to preserve the same
level of economic expansion (or contraction).
We are now ready to analyse how a change in the parameterisation of the economy
a¤ects the degree of economic expansion through a change in agentsinvestment deci-
sions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption. We focus on a reference economy,

, and we consider a marginal change in any of its fundamental parameters, k 2 
.
This change triggers a variation of the initial equilibrium distributions (; ), which,
in turn, induces a change in the matching allocation emerging in the labour market,
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and a consequent change in the degree of economic expansion, Y . The impact of
a change in any parameter k, on economic expansion can be decomposed as:
dY 
dk
=
264d 
dk
 +

d
dk
 +
d
dk
 

e¤ects on the high-technology sector
375   d
dk
e¤ect on the low-technology sector
(15)
The rst term of equation (15), in brackets, represents the contribution to eco-
nomic expansion generated by a change in the structure of the high-technology sector.
The second term of equation (15) measures the contribution to economic expansion
generated by a change in the structure of the low-technology sector. This term is
negative because, over the process of technological di¤usion, rms switch from the
low-technology to the high-technology sector. There is no entry of new rms in this
model. The contribution to economic expansion generated in the high-technology
sector can be further decomposed into three e¤ects: (i) the direct expansion e¤ect,
(ii) the creative destruction e¤ect, and (iii) the skill-upgrading e¤ect. In this simple
model, the direct expansion e¤ect only operates through changes in the productivity
of the high-technology,  . A positive creative destruction e¤ect increases aggregate
production by allowing more high-technology rms to be matched with the existing
proportion of skilled workers. Given an existing stock of high-technology plants, a
positive skill-upgrading e¤ect also increases aggregate production by allowing more
skilled workers in the labour market to reduce the number of unproductive matches.15
We now impose a restriction on the parametric conguration of the economy in
order to rule out the extreme case of technological change associated to economic
contraction. Thus, on the basis of the result of Proposition 6.6, we provide the
following denition.
Denition 6.3
Consider the set of all the economies 
 : 
 = f;  ; ; C; ;Dg and dene:

+ =
n

 :  > 1
 
o
. 
+ identies the set of all the economies associated to
an endogenous distribution of skills and technologies that generates economic
expansion.
We restrict our attention to changes of the investment costs in skill-acquisition
and technology adoption, and to changes in the bargaining power of workers:16 k 2
15The creative destruction also displays e¤ects in the low-technology sector because an increase
in the number of rms in the high-technology sector is mirrored by a reduction in the number of
rms operating in the low-technology sector, and vice versa.
16This restriction does not appear to us as a narrow limitation of our analysis. The productivity of
the high-technology was assumed exogenous to the model, and cannot be a¤ected by the intervention
of any economic agent. We believe it is more interesting to focus on the structure of the investment
costs, and on the parameter regulating distribution, as these are the parameters that can be more
easily targeted by the policy-maker.
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f; ; C; ;Dg. Under this restriction, the direct expansion e¤ect from equation (15)
is always null, and equation (15) can be re-written as:
dY 
dk
=
d
dk
(   1) + d

dk
 (16)
Re-arranging equation (16) we can derive the following:
Proposition 6.8
Given an economy 
, with 
 2 
+, and its associated equilibrium distribu-
tion of skills and technologies, (; ). For a marginal change in any of the
parameters, k 2 
, the sign of the change in the degree of economic expan-
sion, dY , can be determined comparing the relative change in the equilib-
rium proportions of skilled workers and high-technology rms with the slope of
the the iso-expansion relationship IE(Y

) evaluated at the initial equilibrium,
(; ). Therefore:
(i) if d

dk
> 0 : d
=dk
d=dk >   
 
(  1) =) dY

dk
> 0;
(ii) if d

dk
< 0 : d
=dk
d=dk >   
 
(  1) =) dY

dk
< 0.
Using Figure 4, we can provide an intuition for the properties of Proposition 6.8.
The response functions R1 (
e) and R1 (
e) generate the equilibrium conguration
E1 on the iso-expansion relationship IE(Y1). The intercept of the iso-expansion
relationship, located on the right edge of the (; ) space, identies the actual level
of economic expansion,17 relative to its maximum potential    1. A change in any
parameter of the economy k 2 
 causes a revision of agents optimal investment
decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption. Thus, following a change in k,
the skill-upgrading response function, R (e), and the innovation response function,
R (e), shift and identify a new equilibrium E2.18 When E2 is located above (or
below) the iso-expansion relationship IE(Y1), the economy associated to E2 gen-
erates a higher (or lower) degree of economic expansion, compared to the economy
identied by E1.
The left-hand sides of the inequalities presented in Proposition 6.8 represent the
ratio between the variation in the equilibrium proportion of high-technology rms
per additional skilled worker. The right-hand sides of these inequalities measure the
17Note that, for any given level of economic expansion Y > 0, the iso-expansion relationship can
be represented on the (; ) space as:  ()j(;)2IE(Y ) = Y  1 . Thus, for  = 1, the vertical
intercept of the iso-expansion relation assumes value  = Y  1 .
18In the particular example considered in Figure 4, the skill-upgrading response function is the
only one shifting.
30
Figure 4: Comparative statics on economic expansion.
rate of substitution between high-technology rms and skilled workers required to
generate the same degree of economic expansion associated to equilibrium E1. In
Proposition 6.8 we provide a criterion to determine whether a variation in any of
the fundamental parameters of the economy will generate a higher or a lower level of
economic expansion. Given an exogenous shock to the economy, this criterion relates
the impact on agentsinvestment decisions the left-hand sideto the labour market
performance, on the right-hand side.
On the basis of the criterion presented in Proposition 6.8, the following two
propositions characterise the impact of a change in the costs of investment in skill-
acquisition and technological adoption, as well as of a change in workersbargaining
power, on the degree of economic expansion.
Proposition 6.9
Consider an economy 
, with 
 2 
+, its equilibrium distribution of skills and
technologies, (; ), and its associated level of economic expansion, Y . A
reduction of either the costs of investment in skill-acquisition, C or , or the
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costs of investment in technology adoption, D or , determines an increase in
the economys degree of expansion. Therefore:
(i)  dY 
dC
> 0; dY 
d
> 0;
(ii)  dY 
dD
> 0; dY 
d
> 0.
The results derived in Proposition 6.9 are intuitively straightforward. A reduction
of the costs of investment in skill-acquisition induces a positive skill-upgrading e¤ect,
as well as a reduction of the costs of investment in technology adoption enhances a
positive creative destruction e¤ect. Either e¤ect contributes to promote the di¤usion
of the high-technology and to increase aggregate production, fostering economic ex-
pansion. Using the diagram presented in Figure 4, Property (i) of Proposition 6.9 is
represented by a shift to the right of the skill-upgrading response function, R (e),
where we can observe that the new equilibrium E2 is located above the iso-expansion
relationship IE(Y1).
Proposition 6.10 considers the e¤ects of policy-intervention on workersbargaining
power.
Proposition 6.10
Consider an economy 
, with 
 2 
+, its equilibrium distribution of skills and
technologies, (; ), and its associated level of economic expansion, Y . A
change in workersbargaining power, , determines an unambiguous e¤ect on
the economys degree of economic expansion if the creative destruction e¤ect
and the skill-upgrading e¤ect display the same sign. In particular:
(i) d

d
> 0 and d

d
> 0 =) dY 
d
> 0;
(ii) d

d
< 0 and d

d
< 0 =) dY 
d
< 0.
(iii) in all the other cases, a change in workersbargaining power displays an
ambiguous e¤ect on the economys degree of economic expansion.
As we have observed commenting the results of Proposition 6.5, a change in work-
ersbargaining power, , generates a direct e¤ect on both workersand rms in-
vestment decisions, as well as an indirect e¤ect on the opposite side of the labour
market. Therefore, according to the position and the slope of the skill-upgrading re-
sponse function and the innovation response function, the skill-upgrading e¤ect and
the creative destruction e¤ect can either display a positive sign or a negative sign.
Proposition 6.10 states that when these two e¤ects display simultaneously the same
sign, a variation of parameter  determines unambiguous e¤ects on economic expan-
sion.19
19In other words, the creative destruction e¤ect and the skill-upgrading e¤ect will both contribute
to foster (or to discourage) economic expansion.
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7 Economic expansion and unemployment
In this section, we present a classication of the macroeconomic outcomes that can
emerge in the economy considered in our model.
Figure 5 represents the equilibrium conguration E1, identied by the response
functions R (e) and R (e). The equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and
high-technology rms, (; ), located at E1; generate an endogenous matching
allocation M fxi;j; (; ) ; p()g(i;j)2(IJ). According to this matching allocation,
some unskilled workers are assigned to high-technology rms and cannot be em-
ployed. The rate of unemployment of this economy can be read on the intercept of
the iso-unemployment relationship IU (u1), on the -axis. The di¤usion of the high-
technology generates a positive level of economic expansion that locates the economy
on the iso-expansion relationship IE
 
Y 1

. The intercept of the iso-expansion rela-
tion represents the actual rate of economic expansion relative to its maximum poten-
tial level    1. The iso-unemployment and the iso-expansion relations, crossing at
the equilibrium conguration E1, divide the (; ) space in four regions. Equilibria
located in these regions display either higher or lower levels of unemployment and
economic expansion, when compared to the levels induced by equilibrium E1.
In particular, we can observe that the Pissarides Region (P) comprehends all the
equilibrium congurations located simultaneously above the iso-expansion relation-
ship, IE
 
Y 1

, and below the iso-unemployment relationship IU (u1). The congu-
rations of equilibrium located in the P-zones full the prediction of Pissarides(1990)
model because moving from equilibrium E1 to the P-zone implies that a highe de-
gree of economic expansion is associated to a lower unemployment rate. The Aghion
and Howitt Region (A&H), instead, identies equilibrium congurations generating
higher unemployment along with higher levels of economic expansion the e¤ects of
creative destructionwhen compared to the initial equilibrium E1. Thus, even in its
simplicity, we observe that our framework can reproduce the contrasting predictions
of Pissarides (1990), and Aghion and Howitt (1994). Our way to capture Pissarides
capitalisation e¤ect is based on di¤erent microeconomic foundations. More precisely,
in our model, economic expansion is negatively correlated with unemployment when
the skill-upgrading e¤ect dominates the creative destruction e¤ect. On the other
hand, our model fulls the predictions of Aghions and Howitts Neo-Schumpeterian
approach, when the number of workers who engage in skill-acquisition activities is not
su¢ cient to sustain the di¤usion of the new technology at the same rate of unemploy-
ment. In this case, the skill-upgrading e¤ect is dominated by the creative destruction
e¤ect.
Consider a reference economy 
 and its associated equilibrium conguration E1.
A change in any of the fundamental parameters of 
 causes a revision of agents
investment decisions, which could be represented in Figure 5 as a shift of the skill-
upgrading response function, R (e), and/or of the innovation response function,
R (e). This shift generates a change in the equilibrium proportions of skilled work-
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Figure 5: Labour market equilibrium, expansion, and unemployment.
ers and high-technology rms. In the case of economic expansion, the new equilibrium
conguration, E2, could be located either in the P-Region or in the A&H-Region.
Thus, economic expansion can be associated with either lower or higher levels of un-
employment. The relative changes in the equilibrium proportions of skilled workers
and high-technology rms are determined by the two response functions, which rep-
resent the investment decision stage of the model. The classication of equilibria is
determined by the iso-unemployment and the iso-expansion relationship, which pro-
vide the link between labour market performance and the macroeconomic outcomes.
The classication of possible e¤ects induced by policy-intervention aimed at re-
ducing the costs of investment in skill-acquisition and technology adoption are sum-
marised in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, respectively. Both these policies generate a higher
degree of economic expansion, because both the creative destruction e¤ect and the
skill-upgrading e¤ect display a positive sign. Nevertheless, the e¤ects on unemploy-
ment are ambiguous.
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Table 7.1: Macroeconomic e¤ects of C # and  #
@R()
@

(;)
< 1 @
R()
@

(;)
> 1

1  < 1 Y " u ? Y " u "

1  > 1 Y " u # Y " u ?
Table 7.1 highlights that (i) if the initial equilibrium proportion of innovating
rms is relatively small and, (ii) rmsinnovation activities are very sensitive to an
increase in the proportion of skilled workers, subsidies to skill-acquisition generate
economic expansion with more unemployment. Conversely, a large initial proportion
of innovating rms and a weak response of rms to workersskill-acquisition activities
generate economic expansion with less unemployment.
Table 7.2: Macroeconomic e¤ects of D # and  #
@R()
@

(;)
< 1 @
R()
@

(;)
> 1

1  < 1 Y " u " Y " u ?

1  > 1 Y " u ? Y " u #
In a similar way, Table 7.2 shows that policy measures aimed at sustaining inno-
vation activities have to be evaluated considering workersstrategic reaction to an
increase in the proportion of high-technology rms. These policies can foster eco-
nomic expansion, and reduce unemployment, if (i) the initial proportion of skilled
workers is su¢ ciently high, and (ii) workersinvestment decisions in skill-acquisition
are highly sensitive to an increase in the number of high-technology rms. In the op-
posite situation that is, a low initial proportion of skilled workers and weak workers
strategic response to rmsinnovation activitiesthe di¤usion of the high-technology
generates an economic expansion with higher unemployment.
We can conclude that policy measures aimed at reducing the costs of investment
in skill-acquisition and technology adoption foster economic expansion but display
ambiguous e¤ects on unemployment. Policies aimed at subsidising skill demand or
skill supply may generate di¤erent outcomes, and the choice of the most opportune
intervention should be based on the initial parametric conguration of the economy,
which a¤ects: (i) the equilibrium allocation of workers to rms, and (ii) the rela-
tive strength of strategic complementarities and strategic substitutabilities between
agentsinvestment decisions, and (iii) the performance of the labour market.
Table 7.3: Macroeconomic e¤ects of  "
d
d > 0
d
d < 0
d
d > 0 Y " u ? Y ? u #
d
d < 0 Y # u ?
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Table 7.3 summarises the possible consequences of intervention on workersbar-
gaining power.20 An increase in workersbargaining power determines unambiguous
e¤ects on economic expansion only when the skill-upgrading e¤ect and the creative de-
struction e¤ect display the same sign. More skilled workers and high-technology rms
generate a higher degree of economic expansion, as the number of productive high-
technology matches increases. Nevertheless, an increase in workersbargaining power
reduces unemployment only when a positive skill-upgrading e¤ect is combined with a
negative creative destruction e¤ect. In this case, the number of high-technology rms
decreases and the number of skilled workers increases. Since skilled workers can be
employed by either high or low-technology rms, and the number of high-technology
vacancies is lower, unskilled unemployment falls. The economy registers a higher
number of productive matches with high-technology rms, but the overall number
of innovating rms is lower. Therefore aggregate production can either increase or
decrease. Table 7.3 highlights that when the e¤ects on economic expansion are un-
ambiguous, e¤ects on unemployment are ambiguous. Vice versa, when e¤ects on
unemployment are well dened, e¤ects on economic expansion are ambiguous. This
result is not surprising because intervention on workersbargaining power determines
direct e¤ects and strategic complementarity e¤ects both within and across the two
sides of the labour market, generating a wide set of possible outcomes.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered an economy that experiences a wave of skill-biased
technological change and search and matching frictions in the labour market. Hetero-
geneous workers and heterogeneous rms engage in skill-acquisition and technology
adoption activities prior to searching for a compatible production partner. In this
framework, agents form expectations about the matching allocation emerging in the
labour market, and make optimal investment in skills or technology consistent with
these expectations. We have shown that, under the assumption of skill and technol-
ogy complementarity, the investment decisions of workers and rms are strategically
related. From the aggregation of agents investment decisions we have derived an
endogenous distribution of skills and technologies. Subsequently, we have examined
how these two distributions a¤ect the labour market outcome. Technological di¤u-
sion, economic expansion, and unskilled unemployment emerge as the macroeconomic
outcomes of agentsinvestment activities taken in the rst stage of the modeland
labour market performance emerging in the second stage of the model.
Our framework is able to generate two equilibria. In the rst equilibrium no agent
invests in either innovation or skill-acquisition. This equilibrium is typically unstable
and it represents our benchmark case: an economy that does not promote the intro-
20We have only reported the case of an increase in workersbargaining power, as the case of a
decrease in  simply follows changing signs. The case of d

d > 0 and
d
d < 0 never occurs.
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duction of the new technology. As soon as technology adoption and skill-acquisition
activities take place in the economy, the presence of strategic complementarities leads
agents to form mutual expectations about the proportions of skilled workers and in-
novating rms that will enter the labour market. These expectations are fullled in
the stable equilibrium (; ). In contrast with many models in related literature, an
interesting feature of the stable equilibrium with skill-acquisition and technological
di¤usion is the presence of an imbalance between the proportion of skilled workers and
high-technology rms.21 The case of a larger proportion of skilled workers,  > ,
is a likely outcome because workers have higher incentive to invest in skill-acquisition
to insure themselves against the risk of unskilled unemployment, whereas innovating
rms run the risk of being unproductively matched with an unskilled worker. In equi-
librium, a higher proportion of skilled workers implies the presence of over-education:
a stylised fact of many modern economies.22 Another stylised fact captured by non-
extreme values23 of the equilibrium conguration (; ) is the coexistence of two
technologies and two types of workers in the economy. Thus, full di¤usion of the
innovative technology, as well as complete skill-upgrading of the labour force, may
never occur.24 From a technical point of view, our model departs from the standard
approach adopted by similar frameworks, such as Redding (1996) and Acemoglu
(1997). These coordination-game models identify two symmetric Nash-equilibria. In
one equilibrium, all agents take the same (symmetric) investment decision, whereas,
in the other equilibrium, no agent takes any investment decision. Our model encom-
passes this symmetric approach, widening the set of possible equilibrium outcomes
and considering symmetric equilibria only as a particular case.
Unsurprisingly, we nd that the labour market plays a fundamental role in charac-
terising the link between economic expansion and unemployment. More interestingly,
we have also emphasized that, when agents act strategically, they internalise the
role played by search and matching frictions in their investment decisions in skill-
acquisition and technology adoption. Therefore, policy-intervention aimed at pro-
21Our model still admits equilibria displaying equal proportions of skilled workers and high-
technology rms, but these equilibria only represent a special case, holding for particular para-
meterisations of the economy.
22For an overview on over-education in the UK the interested reader can refer to: Machin and
Vignoles (2005), Chapter 9, and Chevalier and Lindley (2006). For a more general perspective see
also Chevalier (2003).
23We classify the values of the conguration (; ) as non-extremewhen: 0 <  < 1 and
0 <  < 1.
24Evidently, our static model of search and production does not consider competition between
rms on the nal goods market. Competition on the nal goods market represents a fundamental
rationale for the Neo-Schumpeterian assumption that new technologies are direct substitutes for old
technologies. Nevertheless, other contributions in literature, such as Young (1993) and Lloyd-Ellis
(2002), claim that human capital accumulation and innovation activities should be simultaneously
taken into account within the same framework. Young (1993) shows that, in a model with both
innovation and human capital accumulation, old and new technologies can be complements in the
short-run and substitutes only in the long-run.
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moting economic expansion and lowering unskilled unemployment should also address
this strategic interaction between agents. The presence of strategic complementari-
ties across the two sides of the labour market and strategic substitutabilities within
either side of the labour market constitutes the fundamental link between agentsin-
vestment decisions in skills and technologies, the degree of economic expansion, and
the rate of unemployment. Subsidies to skill acquisition and technology adoption
activities a¤ect the performance of the labour market.
The key results of our model are determined by the interaction of the creative
destruction e¤ect and of the skill-upgrading e¤ect. Both e¤ects contribute to foster
technological di¤usion and economic expansion, but they compete in the determi-
nation of the unemployment outcome. The introduction of the skill-upgrading e¤ect
is one of the fundamental novelties of our analysis. Building on the contribution of
Acemoglu (1997), we have observed that the existing literature on matching mod-
els for growth, technological change, and unemployment has mainly focused on the
mechanism of creative destruction, devoting attention to the microeconomic founda-
tions of rms investment decisions, and neglecting the role played by endogenous
heterogeneity in the composition of the labour force. Moreover, we argued that even
Acemoglus (1997) results are biased in the same direction because, in his model,
investment decisions in technology adoption and training activities are both taken by
rms, within the same side of the labour market. Therefore, the creative destruction
e¤ect and the skill-upgrading e¤ect are not independent of each other.25 In our model,
we are able to separate out the skill-upgrading e¤ect from the creative destruction ef-
fect by assuming that either side of the labour market faces a separate investment
decision: skill-acquisition for workers and technology adoption for rms. In this way,
investment decisions in skills and technologies are not strategic complements within
the same side of the labour market, but across the two sides of the labour market.
In addition, by assuming that skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities
are subject to congestion costs, we have introduced strategic substitutabilities within
each side of the labour market. This new set-up displays some relevant implications
for policy intervention. In particular, we nd that the opportunity to subsidise either
skill-upgrading or innovation activities has to be evaluated in relation to (i) to the
interplay of strategic complementarities and substitutabilities between agentsinvest-
ment decisions, and to (ii) the performance of the matching mechanism operating in
the labour market. Both these factors depend on the parametric conguration of the
economy, including the bargaining power of workers, the degree of ex-ante heterogene-
ity between workers and rms, and the relative cost of skill-acquisition and technology
adoption activities. We believe that this result should be interpreted by accepting
that there is no unique prescription to prevent the rising of unskilled unemployment
over a wave of skill-biased technological change. The institutional set-up of the labour
market captured in our model by the workersbargaining power parameterconsti-
25In Acemoglu (1997) the attention of the policy-maker is focused on innovation activities, since
the decisions about innovation and training are both under rmscontrol.
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tutes only one of the dimensions to be examined. Di¤erent economies may benet
from di¤erentiated policy-intervention schemes aimed to subsidise either innovation
or skill-acquisition. The formulation of these schemes should take simultaneously into
account the structure of the economys education system, and the e¢ ciency of the
process of technology adoption. Thus, rather than suggesting a focus on only one
side of the labour market, further e¤ort should be invested in rising the awareness of
the policy-makers on the importance of the coordination between skill-demand and
skill-supply.
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Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Consider equation (6). Taking derivatives:
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Proof of Proposition 4.2
Consider equation (10). Taking derivatives:
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Proof of Proposition 6.1
Consider a generic iso-unemployment relation:
IU (u) = f(; ) : (1  ) = ug.
We can re-write the equation of IU (u) in the (; ) space as:
j(;)2IU(u) = u1  .
Observe that: lim
!0+
j(;)2IU(u) = u; lim
!1 
j(;)2IU(u) = +1, and:
(i) d

d

(;)2IU(u)
= u
(1 )2 > 0;
(ii) d
2
d2

(;)2IU(u)
= 2u
(1 )3 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.3
Properties (i) and (ii)
According to Property (ii) of Proposition 4.1, a reduction of the investment cost
parameter, C, or of the congestion cost parameter, , generate the same e¤ects on
the two response functions. Therefore, we analyse only the case of a reduction in C,
as the case of a reduction of  can be derived in a similar way.
From Property (ii) of Proposition 4.1, we know that: @
R(e)
@C
< 0. Therefore, the
e¤ect of a reduction in C corresponds to:  @R(e)
@C
> 0.
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Since @
R(e)
@C
= 0, the skill-upgrading response function shifts right, while the
innovation response function is not sensitive to a change in C (or ). Thus, the
change in the equilibrium distributions of skills and technologies takes place shifting
the skill-upgrading response function and moving along the innovation response
function.
Property (i) of Proposition 4.2 states that: @
R(e)
@
> 0 and @
2R(e)
@2
< 0.
Therefore, combining  @R(e)
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> 0 with @
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> 0, implies that:
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> 0 and  d
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> 0.
Moreover, @
2R(e)
@2
< 0 implies that, when  is su¢ ciently high, the e¤ect of
congestions in technology adoption becomes stronger and stronger.
(We also observe that, since @
R(e)
@
> 0, higher values of  are associated
with relatively high values of ).
This, by return, implies: @
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Using (12), we can decompose the e¤ects of a reduction in C on unemployment:
 du
dC
=  d
dC
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, and apply Property (ii) of Proposition 6.2:
 du
dC
< 0,  d
dC
(1  ) <  d
dC
 ,  d=dC d=dC < 

1  .
Combining these results, we can now construct the following table:
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Property (iii)
From the table derived in the proof of properties (i) and (ii), we can
observe that:
 > 1  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Therefore, in these cases, Property (ii) of Proposition 6.2 does not provide an
informative criterion to characterise the e¤ects of a reduction of C or  on
unemployment.
Proof of Proposition 6.4
Properties (i) and (ii)
According to Property (ii) of Proposition 4.2, a reduction of the investment cost
parameter, D, or in the congestion cost parameter, , generate the same e¤ects on
the two response functions. Therefore, also in this case, we analyse only the case of
a reduction in D, as the case of a reduction in  can be derived in a similar way.
From Property (ii) of Proposition 4.2, we know that: @
R(e)
@D
< 0. Therefore, the
e¤ect of a reduction in D corresponds to:  @R(e)
@D
> 0.
Since @
R(e)
@D
= 0, the innovation response function shifts up, while the skill-upgrading
response function is not sensitive to a change in D (or ). Thus, the change in the
equilibrium distributions of skills and technologies takes place shifting the innova-
tion response function and moving along the skill-upgrading response function.
Property (i) of Proposition 4.1 states that: @
R(e)
@
> 0 and @
2R(e)
@2
< 0.
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Therefore, combining  @R(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Moreover, @
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< 0 implies that, when  is su¢ ciently large, the e¤ect of
congestions in skill-acquisition becomes stronger and stronger.
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Using (12), we can decompose the e¤ects on unemployment of a reduction in D as:
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Combining these results, we can now construct the following table:
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Property (iii)
From the tables derived in the proof of properties (i) and (ii), we can
observe that:
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Therefore, in these cases, Property (ii) of Proposition 6.2 does not provide an
informative criterion to characterise the e¤ects of a reduction of D or  on
unemployment.
Proof of Proposition 6.5
We begin the proof recalling that, from Property (ii) of Proposition 6.2,
we know that:
(a) d

d
> 0 : d
=d
d=d >
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(b) d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Property (i)
The following table identies the sign of d
=d
d=d following an increase in workers
bargaining power, , under di¤erent scenarios:
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Property (ii)
This can be proven changing signs and following the reasoning described for
Property (i).
The following table identies the sign of  d
=d
 d=d following a decrease in workers
bargaining power, , under di¤erent scenarios:
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We can observe that the case of  d
d
> 0 and  d
d
< 0 is not interesting, as it
can never occur.
If  d
d
< 0 and  d
d
> 0, using (b), we can conclude that:
 d=d
 d=d
( )
< 

(1 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,  du
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Property (iii)
As we have already observed, policy-intervention on the bargaining parameter, ,
can either increase or decrease the equilibrium proportions of skilled workers and
high-technology rms. Therefore, di¤erent cases have to be considered.
The proof of Property (i) and the proof of Property (ii) have both characterised
one case and excluded one case, out of four possible combinations. In all the
remaining cases, we can observe that the sign of the relative change in the equilibrium
proportion of skilled workers and high-technology rms is positive and the slope of
the iso-unemployment relation IU(u) is also positive. Therefore, in these cases,
Property (ii) of Proposition 6.2 does not provide an informative criterion to charac-
terise the e¤ect of an increase (or a decrease) in workersbargaining power.
Proof of Proposition 6.7
Consider a generic iso-expansion relation: IE
 
Y

=

(; ) :  (   1) = Y 	.
Re-writing the function in explicit form in the (; ) space:
j(;)2IE(Y ) = Y  1 .
Taking derivatives:
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From Proposition 6.6 we know that:  > 1
 
, Y > 0. Therefore, to identify the
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sign of the derivatives calculated above we need to analyse two separate cases:
If the economy experiences economic expansion:  > 1
 
and Y > 0. Thus:
lim
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If the economy experiences economic contraction: 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and Y < 0. Thus:
lim
!0+
j(;)2IU(u) =  Y (> 0); lim
!(1= ) 
j(;)2IU(u) = +1;
d
d

(;)2IE(Y )
> 0; d
2
d2

(;)2IU(Y )
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 6.8
Re-arranging (16), it is immediate to observe that:
if d

dk
> 0 : d
=dk
d=dk >   
 
(  1) , dY

dk
> 0;
if d

dk
< 0 : d
=dk
d=dk <   
 
(  1) , dY

dk
> 0.
From the proof of Proposition 6.7, we know that the slope of the iso-expansion
relation, IE

Y

, is: d

d

(;)2IE(Y )
=    Y 
(  1)2 .
We can now observe that, when  > 1
 
, substituting for Y

=  (   1):
d
d

(;)2IE(Y )
=    Y 
(  1)2 =  
 (  1)
(  1)2 =   
 
(  1) :
Therefore, the quantity
h
   
(  1)
i
, represents the slope of the iso-expansion
relation, IE

Y

.
Proof of Proposition 6.9
According to Property (ii) of both Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, the e¤ects
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of a reduction in C and D, generate the same e¤ects of a reduction in  and ,
on the skill-upgrading response function and on the innovation response function,
respectively. Thus, we focus on the e¤ects of a reduction in in C and D, as the case
for  and  can be derived in a similar way.
Moreover, we observe that, when 
 2 
+, the economy experiences economic expan-
sion, so that: Y  > 0 and the slope of the iso-expansion relation evaluated at
(; ) is negative.
Property (i)
From the proof of Proposition 6.3, we know that:  d
dC
> 0 and  d
dC
> 0.
Thus, applying Property (i) of Proposition 6.8:  d
=dC
 d=dC
>0
>    
(  1)
<0
=)  dY 
dC
> 0.
Property (ii)
From the proof of Proposition 6.4, we know that:  d
dD
> 0 and  d
dD
> 0.
Thus, applying Property (i) of Proposition 6.8:  d
=dD
 d=dD
>0
>    
(  1)
<0
=)  dY 
dD
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.10
This proof follows the line of the Proof of Proposition 6.5, but we report all the
passages for accuracy. We begin the proof recalling that, from Proposition 6.8,
we know that:
(a) d

dk
> 0 : d
=dk
d=dk >   
 
(  1) , dY

dk
> 0;
(b) d

dk
< 0 : d
=dk
d=dk >   
 
(  1) , dY

dk
< 0.
Property (i) and (ii)
The following table identies the sign of d
=d
d=d following an increase in workers
bargaining power, , under di¤erent scenarios:
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d
d
> 0 d

d
< 0
d
d
> 0 +  
d
d
< 0 ( ) +
We can observe that the case of d

d
< 0 and d

d
> 0 is not interesting, as it
can never occur. Thus, applying the criterion dened by (a) and (b):
if d

d
> 0 and d

d
> 0: d
=d
d=d
(+)
>    
(  1)
( )
=) dY 
d
> 0;
if d

d
> 0 and d

d
< 0: d
=d
d=d
?
7
( )
   
(  1)
( )
=) dY 
d
?
7 0;
if d

d
< 0 and d

d
< 0: d
=d
d=d
(+)
>    
(  1)
( )
=) dY 
d
< 0.
The following table identies the sign of d
=d
d=d following a decrease in workers
bargaining power, , under di¤erent scenarios:
 d
d
> 0  d
d
< 0
 d
d
> 0 + ( )
 d
d
< 0   +
We can observe that the case of  d
d
> 0 and  d
d
< 0 is not interesting, as it
can never occur. Thus, applying the criterion dened by (a) and (b):
if  d
d
> 0 and  d
d
> 0: d
=d
d=d
(+)
>    
(  1)
( )
=) dY 
d
> 0;
if  d
d
< 0 and  d
d
> 0: d
=d
d=d
( )
?
7    
(  1)
( )
=) dY 
d
?
7 0;
if  d
d
< 0 and  d
d
< 0: d
=d
d=d
(+)
>    
(  1)
( )
=) dY 
d
< 0.
Property (iii)
As observed in Proposition 6.5, policy-intervention on the bargaining parameter,
, can either increase or decrease the equilibrium proportions of skilled workers
and high-technology rms. Therefore, di¤erent cases have to be considered.
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The proof of Property (i) and the proof of Property (ii) have both characterised
one case and excluded one case, out of four possible combinations. In the remaining
two cases, we can observe that the sign of the relative change in the equilibrium
proportion of skilled workers and high-technology rms is negative and the slope of
the iso-unemployment relation IE
 
Y

is also negative. Therefore, in these cases,
Proposition 6.8 does not provide an informative criterion to characterise the e¤ect
of an increase (or a decrease) in workersbargaining power.
52
www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma
ABOUT THE CDMA
The Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis was established by a direct grant from the
University of St Andrews in 2003. The Centre funds PhD students and facilitates a programme of
research centred on macroeconomic theory and policy. The Centre has research interests in areas such as:
characterising the key stylised facts of the business cycle; constructing theoretical models that can match
these business cycles; using theoretical models to understand the normative and positive aspects of the
macroeconomic policymakers' stabilisation problem, in both open and closed economies; understanding
the conduct of monetary/macroeconomic policy in the UK and other countries; analyzing the impact of
globalization and policy reform on the macroeconomy; and analyzing the impact of financial factors on
the long-run growth of the UK economy, from both an historical and a theoretical perspective. The
Centre also has interests in developing numerical techniques for analyzing dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models. Its affiliated members are Faculty members at St Andrews and elsewhere with
interests in the broad area of dynamic macroeconomics. Its international Advisory Board comprises a
group of leading macroeconomists and, ex officio, the University's Principal.
Affiliated Members of the School
Dr Fabio Aricò.
Dr Arnab Bhattacharjee.
Dr Tatiana Damjanovic.
Dr Vladislav Damjanovic.
Prof George Evans.
Dr Gonzalo Forgue-Puccio.
Dr. Michal Horvath
Dr Laurence Lasselle.
Dr Peter Macmillan.
Prof Rod McCrorie.
Prof Kaushik Mitra.
Dr. Elisa Newby
Prof Charles Nolan (Director).
Dr Geetha Selvaretnam.
Dr Ozge Senay.
Dr Gary Shea.
Prof Alan Sutherland.
Dr Kannika Thampanishvong.
Dr Christoph Thoenissen.
Dr Alex Trew.
Senior Research Fellow
Prof Andrew Hughes Hallett, Professor of Economics,
Vanderbilt University.
Research Affiliates
Prof Keith Blackburn, Manchester University.
Prof David Cobham, Heriot-Watt University.
Dr Luisa Corrado, Università degli Studi di Roma.
Prof Huw Dixon, Cardiff University.
Dr Anthony Garratt, Birkbeck College London.
Dr Sugata Ghosh, Brunel University.
Dr Aditya Goenka, Essex University.
Dr Michal Horvath, University of Oxford.
Prof Campbell Leith, Glasgow University.
Prof Paul Levine, University of Surrey.
Dr Richard Mash, New College, Oxford.
Prof Patrick Minford, Cardiff Business School.
Dr Elisa Newby, University of Cambridge.
Dr Gulcin Ozkan, York University.
Prof Joe Pearlman, London Metropolitan University.
Prof Neil Rankin, Warwick University.
Prof Lucio Sarno, Warwick University.
Prof Eric Schaling, South African Reserve Bank and
Tilburg University.
Prof Peter N. Smith, York University.
Dr Frank Smets, European Central Bank.
Prof Robert Sollis, Newcastle University.
Prof Peter Tinsley, Birkbeck College, London.
Dr Mark Weder, University of Adelaide.
Research Associates
Mr Nikola Bokan.
Mr Farid Boumediene.
Miss Jinyu Chen.
Mr Johannes Geissler.
Mr Ansgar Rannenberg.
Mr Qi Sun.
Advisory Board
Prof Sumru Altug, Koç University.
Prof V V Chari, Minnesota University.
Prof John Driffill, Birkbeck College London.
Dr Sean Holly, Director of the Department of Applied
Economics, Cambridge University.
Prof Seppo Honkapohja, Bank of Finland and
Cambridge University.
Dr Brian Lang, Principal of St Andrews University.
Prof Anton Muscatelli, Heriot-Watt University.
Prof Charles Nolan, St Andrews University.
Prof Peter Sinclair, Birmingham University and Bank of
England.
Prof Stephen J Turnovsky, Washington University.
Dr Martin Weale, CBE, Director of the National
Institute of Economic and Social Research.
Prof Michael Wickens, York University.
Prof Simon Wren-Lewis, Oxford University.
www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma
RECENT WORKING PAPERS FROM THE
CENTRE FOR DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Number Title Author(s)
CDMA07/16 Arbitrage and Simple Financial Market
Efficiency during the South Sea Bubble:
A Comparative Study of the Royal
African and South Sea Companies
Subscription Share Issues
Gary S. Shea (St Andrews).
CDMA07/17 Anticipated Fiscal Policy and Adaptive
Learning
George Evans (Oregon and St
Andrews), Seppo Honkapohja
(Cambridge) and Kaushik Mitra (St
Andrews)
CDMA07/18 The Millennium Development Goals
and Sovereign Debt Write-downs
Sayantan Ghosal (Warwick),
Kannika Thampanishvong (St
Andrews)
CDMA07/19 Robust Learning Stability with
Operational Monetary Policy Rules
George Evans (Oregon and St
Andrews), Seppo Honkapohja
(Cambridge)
CDMA07/20 Can macroeconomic variables explain
long term stock market movements? A
comparison of the US and Japan
Andreas Humpe (St Andrews) and
Peter Macmillan (St Andrews)
CDMA07/21 Unconditionally Optimal Monetary
Policy
Tatiana Damjanovic (St Andrews),
Vladislav Damjanovic (St Andrews)
and Charles Nolan (St Andrews)
CDMA07/22 Estimating DSGE Models under Partial
Information
Paul Levine (Surrey), Joseph
Pearlman (London Metropolitan) and
George Perendia (London
Metropolitan)
CDMA08/01 Simple Monetary-Fiscal Targeting Rules Michal Horvath (St Andrews)
CDMA08/02 Expectations, Learning and Monetary
Policy: An Overview of Recent Research
George Evans (Oregon and St
Andrews), Seppo Honkapohja (Bank
of Finland and Cambridge)
CDMA08/03 Exchange rate dynamics, asset market
structure and the role of the trade
elasticity
Christoph Thoenissen (St Andrews)
CDMA08/04 Linear-Quadratic Approximation to
Unconditionally Optimal Policy: The
Distorted Steady-State
Tatiana Damjanovic (St Andrews),
Vladislav Damjanovic (St Andrews)
and Charles Nolan (St Andrews)
CDMA08/05 Does Government Spending Optimally
Crowd in Private Consumption?
Michal Horvath (St Andrews)
www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma
CDMA08/06 Long-Term Growth and Short-Term
Volatility: The Labour Market Nexus
Barbara Annicchiarico (Rome), Luisa
Corrado (Cambridge and Rome) and
Alessandra Pelloni (Rome)
CDMA08/07 Seigniorage-maximizing inflation Tatiana Damjanovic (St Andrews)
and Charles Nolan (St Andrews)
CDMA08/08 Productivity, Preferences and UIP
deviations in an Open Economy
Business Cycle Model
Arnab Bhattacharjee (St Andrews),
Jagjit S. Chadha (Canterbury) and Qi
Sun (St Andrews)
CDMA08/09 Infrastructure Finance and Industrial
Takeoff in the United Kingdom
Alex Trew (St Andrews)
CDMA08/10 Financial Shocks and the US Business
Cycle
Charles Nolan (St Andrews) and
Christoph Thoenissen (St Andrews)
CDMA09/01 Technological Change and the Roaring
Twenties: A Neoclassical Perspective
Sharon Harrison (Columbia) Mark
Weder (Adeleide)
CDMA09/02 A Model of Near-Rational Exuberance George Evans (Oregon and St
Andrews), Seppo Honkapohja (Bank
of Finland and Cambridge) and
James Bullard (St Louis Fed)
CDMA09/03 Shocks, Monetary Policy and
Institutions: Explaining Unemployment
Persistence in “Europe” and the United
States
Ansgar Rannenberg (St Andrews)
CDMA09/04 Contracting Institutions and Growth Alex Trew (St Andrews)
CDMA09/05 International Business Cycles and the
Relative Price of Investment Goods
Parantap Basu (Durham) and
Christoph Thoenissen (St Andrews)
CDMA09/06 Institutions and the Scale Effect Alex Trew (St Andrews)
CDMA09/07 Second Order Accurate Approximation
to the Rotemberg Model Around a
Distorted Steady State
Tatiana Damjanovic (St Andrews)
and Charles Nolan (St Andrews)
..
For information or copies of working papers in this series, or to subscribe to email notification, contact:
Jinyu Chen
Castlecliffe, School of Economics and Finance
University of St Andrews
Fife, UK, KY16 9AL
Email: jc736@at-andrews.ac.uk; Phone: +44 (0)1334 462445; Fax: +44 (0)1334 462444.
